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Money is a fundamental attribute of power. Its international usedepends on whether and how it is supported by a strong econ-omy, which determines a substantial part of the resources of
power (the other being the military). Given the resources, the operating
power of money is closely linked to the strategic objectives of govern-
ments in international politics. The dynamic interaction amongst countries
between resource changes (hard power) on the one hand, and policy doc-
trines on international governance (soft power) on the other hand, shapes
the international monetary system.
China’s ascent is disturbing in international relations, not only because it
is catching up fast in hard power, but also because Chinese ideas of
“human authority” in soft power, stressing international norm-binding in
the pursuit of global harmony, is at odds with Western theories of interna-
tional relations based upon the stabilising power of a single hegemon. (1)
The strategic move to internationalise the renminbi (RMB) is best under-
stood within this alternative view. It is not being done to replace the dollar
with the RMB as a new key currency, but rather to build up a large consen-
sus to abolish hegemony altogether.
The balance of forces between domestic
constraints and foreign opportunities:
Creation of the Hong Kong RMB market
In October 2008, the apex of the first round of the financial crisis en-
tailed a traumatic shock for so open a country as China. The wholesale dol-
lar money market seized up entirely, leading to the collapse of interna-
tional trade. The Chinese leadership was convinced that China should no
longer trust in the robustness of international banks. Furthermore, having
studied the lingering Japanese crisis, Chinese leaders correctly diagnosed
that the financial crisis was the symptom of a much more serious phe-
nomenon: the end of the credit-induced consumer spree that had boosted
Western capitalism since the heyday of financial deregulation. The debt
deflation process in Western economies will last for years. Therefore the
export-led growth regime of the post-WTO decade will no longer support
China’s development. Foreign trade had to be redeployed partly to devel-
oping countries, China had to become the fulcrum of Asian integration, and
trade relations had to be based on long-term contracts. On the financial
side, long-term loans and a system of payments no longer based on the
vagaries of the dollar should back the new phase of globalisation.
However, full RMB convertibility is far from being at hand. It must be pre-
ceded by the liberalisation of financial services and therefore of the whole
structure of interest rates. Such a dramatic change cannot be accom-
plished overnight, all the more given that local governments (especially
counties and municipalities) are overwhelmed with debt. Interest rates
cannot become market-determined before those debts are cleared and the
solvency of local governments has been firmly consolidated. Meanwhile,
monetary authorities have recourse to regulating bank lending rates and
subjecting bonds to bank rates, so that the cost of public finance is min-
imised. Of course, this inefficient financial regulation is costly for the na-
tion. Too low a cost of capital distorts investment patterns and fosters
overcapacities in heavy industries. Regulated interest rates channel all fi-
nancing into a handful of state-owned banks, which enjoy secure profit
margins because household saving is poorly rewarded. They have no incen-
tive for efficient risk management, without which the shock of capital lib-
eralisation would be hazardous and might entail devastating losses, as
happened in Japan and several European countries in the early 1990s.
The main reason for this dismal state of affairs is fiscal. Because China has
no political consensus for agreed-upon rules to transfer fiscal revenues
amongst regional and local governments, the latter suffer huge discrepancies
between their fiscal resources and their commitments to provide basic pub-
lic services. They are forced to indulge in heavy indebtedness, collateralised
by speculative real estate values. This entails that fiscal reform is a prerequi-
site for domestic financial liberalisation. It is a thorny problem of economic
policy that impinges on the political processes that determine the sharing of
fiscal revenues amongst provinces and sub-provincial levels of government.
If full convertibility is a distant prospect in crowning comprehensive fi-
nancial reform, the dearth of international means of payments in the last
three months of 2008 triggered an abrupt slump in world trade that in-
duced a severe contraction in economic activity. The shock convinced
China’s monetary authorities that the seizure of dollar liquidity was capa-
ble of upsetting the pattern of international payments. Was it advanta-
geous to use the dollar as a third-party currency in China’s foreign trade
any longer?
It is the chosen vehicle currency for invoicing and settling trade only if
the transaction costs in using the dollar, involving two currency conver-
sions between the partners in trade, are lower than those incurred in
choosing the currency of one or the other partner. Transaction costs can be
lower using a vehicle currency because they depend essentially on the liq-
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1. The distinction between hard and soft power is deeply anchored in Chinese political philosophy from
the great thinkers of the Warring Kingdoms era (479-221 B.C). A brilliant recent attempt to mobilise
ancient political thinking in clarifying modern concepts of international regimes can be found in Yan
Xuetong, Ancient Chinese thought, modern Chinese power, Princeton University Press, 2011.
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uidity of the money market to which the partners in trade have access. The
larger the volume of trade invoiced and settled in a vehicle currency, the
lower the transaction costs and the broader the use of this currency in in-
ternational commerce and finance. It means that dynamic increasing re-
turns are path-dependent. Even when the shares of the issuing country of
the key currency have been shrinking for a considerable time in world
trade, the key currency goes on being used as a vehicle currency. While a
currency has been accepted as a key currency in international payment,
only a dramatic event that drastically reduces its liquidity can alter the
pattern of international payments. The global financial crisis brought about
that event.
A Chinese importer and a Brazilian exporter, for instance, might find it
advantageous to invoice and settle trade in RMB, on the proviso that RMB
deposits generated by the payment of Chinese imports could gain a com-
petitive return before they were recycled in trade to pay for Brazilian im-
ports of Chinese products. However, the domestic money market in China
is closed to non-residents apart from a handful of QFIs (qualified foreign
investors). This quandary could only be resolved if RMB-denominated fi-
nancial assets were made readily available outside mainland China. Hong
Kong is the ideal financial centre to manage the financial services induced
by the incipient offshore RMB.
Therefore the contradiction between foreign opportunities and domestic
constraints called for a dual market: creating a financial market based on
the RMB offshore, called the CNH market, while keeping financial controls
onshore. The CNH (Hong Kong-delivered Chinese Yuan) market would
stem from invoicing and settling trade, so-called grassroots international-
isation, the underpinning of which was the system of payments.
The Chinese monetary authorities lost no time. In 2009 they launched
the pilot system of invoicing and settling foreign trade in RMB. The system
is located in the Hong Kong financial centre and is backed by a memoran-
dum of understanding between PBOC (People’s Bank of China) and the
HKMA (Hong Kong Monetary Authority) to guarantee and regulate liquid-
ity. Corporate and financial entities, even if not directly involved in trade
with the mainland, have been authorised to open RMB accounts with ac-
credited depositary institutions in Hong Kong. It is the start of the CNH
market, e.g., the market for offshore RMB financial assets.
Functioning and equilibrium of the CNH
market
The incipient impetus for developing the CNH market is the settlement
of Chinese imports invoiced in RMB. The size of the market and therefore
the share of the RMB in global FX (Foreign Exchange) trade will depend pri-
marily on the share of trade invoiced in RMB in China’s imports. Scenario
1 assumes that the share of RMB invoicing in Chinese imports will increase
from 1 percent in 2011 to 20 percent in 2015. Another source of liquidity
in the CNH market might be a loosening of capital controls permitting
funds from Chinese residents to flow out to Hong Kong. Table 1 sums up
the results of the projections for both scenarios.
In scenario 1, a strictly limited number of banks with quotas, led by Bank
of China (Hong Kong), are allowed to invest and borrow liquid funds on the
onshore money markets in China to facilitate the settlement of interna-
tional payments in RMB. Furthermore, willing foreign central banks can
conclude swap agreements with PBOC to diversify a share of their FX re-
serves in RMB through buying government bonds on the onshore interbank
market. In scenario 2, 1 percent of resident bank deposits are supposed to
be allowed to flow abroad.
On the liquidity base so generated, the CNH market creates diversified
investment products (Dim Sum Bonds) and derivatives (CNH deliverable
forwards and cross-currency swaps) to allow foreign enterprises to issue
debt in RMB and manage their foreign exchange risk. An impressive mo-
mentum will be triggered by the rise of the CNH market. Investment banks
will strengthen their FX trading desks in Hong Kong and will nurture their
staff (BBVA, HSBC, Standard Chartered, Deutsche Bank). A lucrative busi-
ness for underwriting securities is opening up.
With this background, the development of the CNH market was driven
by policy events and market reactions to them. In June 2010, both under
intense US pressure and the lobbying of PBOC for more leeway in do-
mestic monetary policy, the government abandoned the peg on the dol-
lar and adopted an effective exchange rate benchmark. The expectation
of RMB appreciation attracted demand by institutional investors all over
the world, eager to put RMB assets in their diversified portfolios. This de-
mand turned speculative in the fall of 2010 after the announcement of
Quantitative Easing 2 by Ben Bernanke at the Jackson Hall Symposium
at the end of August.
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Table 1 – Projections of Chinese imports invoiced in RMB and RMB deposits in Hong Kong
(Value in US$ billions)
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Value of imports settled in RMB 31 74 162 304 482
CNH deposits (scenario 1) 32 67 141 272 475
CNH deposits (scenario 2) 56 125 242 429 706
Source: CEIC. Calculations: Standard Chartered Research.
Table 2 – Yields on 2- to 10-year Chinese 
government bonds as of year-end 2010
In % 2 years 3 years 5 years 10 years
Offshore 1.6 1.0 1.8 2.5
Onshore 3 3.25 3.8 3.95
Source: Reuters.
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The demand of market participants for a range of assets covering ma-
turities and risk ratings competitive with other convertible currencies
was met by Chinese monetary authorities who wanted to channel it to
the Hong Kong market. To accommodate this demand, Chinese mone-
tary authorities have generated a benchmark government bond yield
curve in the Dim Sum bond market. In early December, the government
issued RMB 8 billion worth of fixed-income securities at two, three,
five, and ten-year maturities. In extending the yield curve to 10 years,
the Chinese leadership signalled its will to incentivise international fi-
nancial investors to invest in long-term financial assets. They have re-
sponded eagerly well ahead of issuers. Consequently, two- to ten-year
bond yields in Hong Kong are much lower than the corresponding
yields on similar government bonds sold to domestic investors on the
mainland (table 2).
In August 2011, following a renewed episode of financial crisis in the US
and in Europe, the Chinese government lost faith in the safety of its dollar
assets. Determined to slow down its FX reserve accumulation, the govern-
ment is encouraging domestic businesses to borrow RMB in Hong Kong to
finance capital export outflows. To facilitate the issue of corporate bonds,
on August 17 the government issued RMB 20 billion in sovereign bonds, 15
billion to institutional investors and 5 billion directed at retail investors. (2)
The August 17 issue, which dwarfs the December 2010 issue, aims at cre-
ating a benchmark for the bond market and at reducing the spread be-
tween onshore and offshore rates in raising the supply of high-quality
bonds available offshore.
Because liquid funds offshore and onshore are still imperfectly fungible,
there are two spot FX markets in Hong Kong. The $/CNY exchange rate for
commercial transactions is benchmarked on the exchange rate of the on-
shore spot market, since the RMB is convertible in current accounts. The
$/CNH exchange rate for financial transactions unrelated to trade has a
quotation and a liquidity of its own (figure 1).
Since capital controls hamper arbitrage between RMB offshore and RMB
onshore, there are dual exchange rates. After the birth of the CNH market,
a momentous demand arose for RMB assets in Hong Kong. An ensuing lack
of liquidity appreciated the offshore exchange rate compared to the on-
shore rate. The offshore risk premium culminated around 2 percent. How-
ever, the strength of the RMB encouraged foreign exporters to invoice their
exports to China in RMB. Their deposits in Hong Kong banks built liquidity
surprisingly fast, so that the premium of the offshore yuan on the official
rate closed near year-end 2010. (3) Recently the offshore premium widened
again, signalling renewed pressure for a faster appreciation of the RMB. The
deliverable forward market confirms the finding. It points to a wider expec-
tation of appreciation of the RMB starting in early August, after the an-
nouncement of the downgrading of the US government debt rating and
Ben Bernanke’s declaration to keep short-term interest rates close to zero
for a considerable time (figure 2).
In about one year, the process of financial opening has been put on track.
It confirms the commitment of China’s government to Hong Kong as a
leading financial center in Asia. It will also contribute to slowing down for-
eign exchange reserve accumulation if it induces capital outflows by other
agents than the central bank. It might occur via FDI outflows by domestic
corporations financed in RMB or via trade credit by Chinese exporters able
to invoice export contracts in RMB. Alternatively capital inflows will not
trigger offsetting FX reserve accumulation by the central bank if progres-
sively relaxed regulation permits foreign holders of RMB liquidity in Hong
Kong to invest in mainland securities markets. The foreign holders will have
bought Yuan against dollars abroad in the beginning. The resulting capital
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2. In order to give weight to the move and to show its political importance, vice-Premier Li Keqiang went
to Hong Kong to symbolically launch the massive issuance of RMB 20 billion in sovereign bonds.
3. In November 2010, non-resident deposits in the CNH market had already quadrupled from August. It
does not mean that the market is arbitraged once and for all. The liquidity premium can still be volatile,
as in late April and early May 2011, because the CNH market is not yet deeply entrenched.
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Figure 1 – China: RMB/USD onshore and offshore spot exchange rate
Source: Bloomberg.
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inflows into China via Hong Kong will be offset by a capital outflows be-
tween Chinese and foreign banks. Alternatively, regulation can be progres-
sively relaxed to permit holders of liquidity in Hong Kong to invest in
mainland securities markets.
The long-term significance of RMB
internationalisation
RMB internationalisation has significance both for capital allocation in
the domestic economy and for the evolution of China’s financial relations
with the rest of the world.
Domestically, the PBOC wants to use the Hong Kong market as an indi-
rect way to reform the domestic financial market. The allocation of capital
will be transformed because of the internationalisation of the RMB. The rea-
son is that the market in Hong Kong includes domestic financial institutions
that have already issued corporate bonds in Hong Kong for domestic enter-
prises. This new opportunity for financing creates a link between domestic
and foreign credit in RMB. It is one of the reasons why in 2011 the quantity
of credit obtained by non-financial entities has been higher than the
planned creditor aggregate determined by the central bank and higher than
the aggregate of bank credit to the non-financial sector. Furthermore, be-
cause Chinese financial institutions will directly encounter international
practices in risk management, they will become more risk-conscious.
One must understand that the issue of RMB convertibility is contentious
amongst different power strongholds within the central government. On
one side, the Ministry of Trade and the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) are growth-minded and much concerned about ex-
ternal competitiveness. They are allied with provincial officials alarmed at
the slightest hint of rising unemployment, and with executives of SOEs,
whose power is enhanced by high retention of earnings to be ploughed
back into fixed capital accumulation. They make a powerful and influential
lobby while growth shows signs of weakening. On the other side, the PBOC
and other financial regulatory institutions are well aware that the mecha-
nism for allocating savings in China and the excessive recourse to banks at
the expense of capital markets entails a distorted allocation of saving and
therefore widespread inefficiencies. Furthermore, the PBOC would appre-
ciate greater access to interest rates as a channel for running monetary
policy, whether or not this channel could impinge upon the full range of
interest rates. The PBOC view has been strengthened by the threat of in-
flation. More flexible exchange rates, allowing monetary policy to focus on
domestic objectives, would suit the PBOC very well. In launching the off-
shore program to internationalise the RMB while getting rid of the de facto
peg on the dollar, the State Council has struck a compromise. It allows
SOEs to finance their expansion abroad in the cheapest way possible for
the purpose of becoming global corporations before 2015. It creates a po-
tentially large international market for the RMB that enlarges its interna-
tional use in trade and investment with other emerging market countries.
Meanwhile it keeps the core of capital controls that preserves the dual
market for interest rates. Capital controls might not reduce the magnitude
of capital flows overall, but they shape their structure to discourage dis-
ruptive hot money and favour beneficial long-term flows. (4)
In international politics, RMB internationalisation pertains to a soft
power strategy aimed at binding Asian countries into a regional zone of
prosperity while reducing US interference. Expansion of intra-regional
trade in East Asia and a large market in long-term bonds to finance mutu-
ally important infrastructure, energy, and primary resource supply will be
facilitated by a large circulation of RMB in China’s neighbouring countries.
An increase of the RMB’s share in basket currencies used by ASEAN coun-
tries might help stabilise the bilateral exchange rates between their own
currencies and the RMB.
Those structural developments foster a gradual process for an exit from
the key currency status of the dollar and contribute to a polycentric sys-
Current affairs
Figure 2 – China: spot and one-year RMB/USD exchange rate, offshore market 
Source: Bloomberg.
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4. In conformity with the principle of incremental change, the PBOC issued a new regulation in mid-June
2011 on cross-border FDIs. The rule allows all foreign companies (including subsidiaries of Chinese
firms incorporated in Hong Kong) to remit on the mainland in the form of FDIs all funds raised on the
offshore market. It is a big push for internationalising the RMB, which still protects the domestic mar-
ket from many sources of speculative capital inflows.
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tem based upon a loose Asia-wide monetary area centred on RMB con-
vertibility together with dollar and euro regions. The advantage of regional
monetary zones is that they can manage financial disturbances within the
region and prevent them from spilling over to the wider International
Monetary System. An implicit subsidiary principle would apply.
Large and open regional economic zones can grasp the welfare gains of
integration with proper cooperation. But the correlative move to a multi-
polar system will entail an asymmetrical competition between leading
currencies that might exacerbate the present woes. Discordant economic
policies will be under the fire of intense portfolio shifts, triggering much
higher volatility in leading exchange rates. The lack of a global viewpoint
on liquidity and the determination of an anchor to world prices will be-
come more acute problems. At that point, China’s plea for international
governance based upon responsibility of the main powers exerted under
mutually binding rules and upon the promotion of an international reserve
asset might become credible.
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